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Geoffrey 3 Butler, Clerk
Utah Supreme Court
322 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Dear Mr . 'But I e,i;:;
Re:

.Johnson vs. Rogers, et al.
Case No. 20622

I represent Donald Rogers in the above-referenced matter, which
is scheduled for oral argument on Wednesday, November 12, 1986,
at 9:00 a.m. Pursuant to Rule 24 (j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, I would like to supplement my argument, that
evidence of intoxication alone is insufficient to justify an
award of punitive damages, found on Page 3 of the Brief on Appeal of respondent, Donald Rogers. The Supreme Court of Arizona
recently decided the case of Linthicum v. Nationwide Life Ins.
Co., 723 P.2d 673 (1986). One of the major issues in that case
dealt with punitive damages and what mental state was required
for the imposition of such damages. The Court concluded as
follows:
As discussed earlier, it is the "evil mind" that
distinguishes action justifying the imposition
of punitive damages. . . . In whatever the requisite mental state is expressed, the conduct
must also be aggravated and outrageous. It is
conscious action of a reprehensible character.
The key is the wrongdoer's intent to injure the
plaintiff or his deliberate interference with the
rights of others, consciously disregarding the
unjustifiably substantial risk of significant
harm to them. . . . While the necessary "evil
mind" may be inferred, it is still this "evil
mind" in addition to outwardly aggravated, outrageous, malicious, or fraudulent conduct which
is required for punitive damages. We hold that
before a jury may award punitive damages, there
must be evidence of an "evil mind" and aggravated
and outrageous conduct, [Emphasis added.]
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Geoffrey J. Butler
October 30, 1986
Page 2
For the Court's convenience, I enclose herewith a photocopy of
the Linthicum decision.
Very truly yours,

p
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P. Keith Nelson
PKN:s
cc Lowell V. Smith
Edward J. McDonough
Gordon L. Roberts
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3. Damages <3=>184
Before a jury may award punitive damages there must be evidence of an "evil
mind" and aggravated and outrageous conduct. •• ,.;•...' . ;•;;.. •'',.: .."•.• .i ". .. • ,'..' :.L<v^; '
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SATIONWIDE LIFE INSURANCE CO.,
an Ohio corporation, and Dan R. Wagnon and Associates, Inc., an Arizona
corporation, Defendants-Appellants.
No.

675

manner in deliberate controvention to the
rights of the victim.

jtndra LINTHICUM, widow, surviving
wife and Personal Representative of the
Estate of Jerry Linthicum, deceased,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
about J
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4. Damages <3=»184
Burden of proof for punitive damages
is by clear and convincing evidence.

CV 86-0061-PR.

Supreme Court of Arizona,
In Banc.
/

- .v

July 23, 1986.
Reconsideration Denied Sept. 9, 1986.
Suit was brought against insurer and
b claims agency for breach of contract
tad bad faith. The Superior Court, Maricopa County, Cause No. C-446562, Robert
Hertzberg, J., awarded compensatory and
punitive damages. The Court of Appeals,
Ariz.App., 723 P.2d 703, reversed the punitive damage award, but affirmed on all
•her issues, and review was granted. The
Supreme Court, Cameron,' J., held that
*hile insurer may not have dealt with the
insureds in good faith, there was not sufficient evidence of an evil mind, illustrating a
«sire to consciously disregard insureds'
rights and therefore punitive damages
*ere not warranted.
i

v
5. Insurance <3=>602.2( 1)
Punitive damages are recoverable in a
bad-faith action where defendant's conduct
is aggravated, outrageous, malicious or
fraudulent, combined with an evil mind as
evidenced by showing that defendant was
consciously aware of the needs and rights
of the insured and nevertheless ignored its
obligations. " '-•'••* ••••••• .•-: ••
<;

6. Insurance <3=>602.2(1)
While insurer may not have dealt with
the insureds in good faith, there was not
sufficient evidence of an evil mind, illustrating a desire to consciously disregard
insureds' rights and therefore punitive
damages were not warranted in a bad-faith
:
action.
-**• ••
' ^ -*>v:-:r--...:•:
•:•.;:;;;
Hofmann, Salcito, Stevens & Myers by
Robert D. Myers and Leroy W. Hofmann,
Phoenix, for plaintiff-appellee.
' !,: ~'^ ;

McCord & Howe by Warren S. McCord,
Scottsdale,
and Kornblum, Kelly & Herlihy
Reversed in part and affirmed in part.
by Guy 0 . Kornblum and Abigail S. Kelly,
San. Francisco, Cal., for defendants-appel\ Damages <3=>87(1)
- ^ 'lants. t.
,'..... ,_. ,
. ^.....:/.
Exemplary or punitive damages are
Streich, Lang, Weeks & Cardon by Louis
those damages awarded in excess of full A. Stahl, William S. Hawgood, II and Susan
toinpensation to victim in order to punish Gaylord Gale, Phoenix, for amicus curiae
^ wrongdoer and to deter others from American Council of Life Ins. and Health
^ulating his conduct.
, , v, Ins. Assoc, of America.
V -..'*.•.,:
»

•

*

.

* Damages <3=>91(1)
In deciding whether punitive damages
^ awardable, inquiry should be focused
*P°n the wrongdoer's mental state; wronge r must be consciously aware of the
**°ngfulness or harmfulness of his con^ct and yet continue to act in the same

Langerman, Begam, Lewis and Marks by
Amy G. Langerman, Phoenix, for amicus
curiae Arizona Trial Lawyers Assoc. ':"
CAMERON, Justice.

. •

;

^

This is a petition for review of a decision
and opinion of the court of appeals which
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affirmed a jury award of compensatory
damages for bad faith against Nationwide
Life Insurance Company, but reversed the
award of two million dollars in punitive
damages. Linthicum v. Nationwide Life
Insurance Company, — Ariz. — , 723
P.2d 703, [1985]. We have jurisdiction pursuant to art 6 § 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution, A.R.S. § 12-120.24 and Rule 23,
Ariz.R.Civ.App.P., 17A A.R.S.
We granted oral argument on the petition for review and asked that counsel direct their attention to the following questions:
1. Assuming that indifference to or failure to consider the interests of the
insured is sufficient grounds for
award of tort damages in a bad faith
case, what additional requirement or
standard is appropriate to justify an
award of punitive damages?
2. Does the evidence in this case meet
or fail to meet that standard?
After oral argument We granted the petition for review as to the issue of punitive
damages only. We affirm the decision and
opinion of the court of appeals as to the
other issues considered by that court

Following his surgery, Jerry was i*.
quired to see Dr. Skinner monthly to ban
his blood tested for any surgery induced
hypocalcemia (low blood calcium) or a reo£
currence of his prior symptoms. He a&>
returned to work, gained twenty-fii|
pounds, and resumed his active lifestyle
• "*'^M§

Effective 1 April 1980, Sandra Iinthica3|
(Sandra) obtained medical insurance fron
Nationwide Life Insurance Company (N^
tionwide) through a group insurance policy
issued to her employer, Arizona Optica^
Company. The policy was also to include
coverage for her husband, Jerry, as a d£K
pendent Sandra never received a copy at
this policy, but instead was simply added a^
a certificate-holder of the policy issued to,
Arizona Optical Company. Both the group*
policy and the certificate contained the fok
lowing limitation as to preexisting illness^
Eligible expenses do not include w£jr.
charges incurred . . . (7) for an illness foi;;
which the Insured Person received me&i
cal care or treatment within the 90 days „
preceding the effective date of his insur-?
ance hereunder
The term "treatrf
ment" includes the taking of any drug
J
prescribed by a physician.
lH§g

The facts follow. In September 1979,
Jerry Linthicum (Jerry) was hospitalized by
his family physician, Dr. James Skinner. A
tumor on one of his parathyroid glands1
was surgically removed by Dr. Robert A.
Brock on 28 September 1979. At that time,
Jerry's physicians, Dr. Skinner and Dr.
Brock, plus the pathologist at Phoenix General Hospital, Dr. Voit, determined based
upon tissue samples that it was parathyroid adenoma, ie. a benign tumor. However, as these tumors can be differently
interpreted, some representative slides
were sent to the Mayo Clinic for verification. A pathologist at the Mayo Clinic, Dr.
Edward Soule, also diagnosed it as parathyroid adenoma. The final diagnosis in the
summary addendum of Phoenix General
Hospital, prepared by Dr. Vericolli, also
states parathyroid adenoma.

During the ninety day period prior, to^
Sandra's insurance becoming effective, Dr^
Skinner saw Jerry on 16 January, 25 FeWL
ruary and 18_ March 1980, for blood testeT^
The March blood test revealed that hifcr
«*
blood pressure and calcium level were both
slightly elevated (hypertension and hyper- ~£
calcemia). Dr. Skinner prescribed a bloody
pressure medication, Enduronyl Forte,Jerry also received treatment from a Dr.
Emerson, during February, for a shoulder
injury

1. There are four parathyroid glands -located
within the thyroid gland. The parathyroid

glands secrete a hormone which regulates the
amount of calcium in the body.

policy number ;
durance inforn
On U Juty 1 9
Jerry and disco
carcinoma (ca
glands. Dr.Ro
roid gland, inc!
parathyroid gl*
remove all th<
•throughout th
irea. Dr. Ros
lx)S Angeles
records and t
1979 surgery,
previous diag
tumor discove
nant and not

On 12 June 1980, Jerry became ill while .&.
playing softBall. Dr. Skinner had Jerry ^
admitted to Phoenix General Hospital and S
later transferred him to the Hospital of the II
Good Samaritan in Los Angeles, California, %
under the care of Dr. Leonard Rosoff. At *|
both hospitals, Sandra gave the Nationwide
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and finally any information on treatment
rendered by any other doctors.
Dr. Skinner responded to such a letter by
On 11 July 1980, Dr. Rosoff operated on
stating
that he had moved his practice and
jjty and discovered extensive metastatic
that
all
Jerry's medical records were in the
irtinoma (cancer) of the parathyroid
possession
of his former employer, Dr.
iapds. Dr. Rosoff removed the entire thyLuke.
Dr.
Luke,
however, claimed that he
^d gland, including the three remaining
did
not
have
the
records.
Ms. Nihoff then
leithyroid glands, but he was unable to
sent
another
form
letter
to
Dr. Skinner for
*aove all the cancer as it had spread
"reconsideration".
Dr.
Skinner
again stattroughout the neck and into the chest
ed that Dr. Luke had the medical records.
gn. Dr. Rosoff and Dr. Roger Terry, a
Dr. Skinner also stated.that Jerry's cafe
Angeles pathologist, examined the
was "complicated" and that Nationwide
coords and tissue samples from Jerry's
should call him if they had any questions.
3T9 surgery. They disagreed with the
Dr. Luke, in response to a second letter,
jmious diagnosis and concluded that the
provided dates, diagnosis, (hyperparathyamor discovered in 1979 had been maligroidism with hypercalcemia, hypertension),
aat and not benign.
medication and charges for Jerry's monthly
The bills from Phoenix General Hospital office visits during January, February and
ed the Hospital of the Good Samaritan March 1980. Dr. Luke also indicated that
w e submitted to Nationwide. The claim these visits were follow-up care from his
n s processed by Ms, Georgia Nihoff, sen- 1979 surgery and that Jerry was a patient
' claims examiner. Ms. Nihoff testified of Dr. Skinner's during this time, not his.
4at she followed Nationwide's normal proDr. Rosoff responded to a similar inquiry
•dure concerning claims by new insureds from Nationwide. Dr. Rosoff stated that
«d initiated an investigation to determine Jerry had parathyroid carcinoma but that
i the claim was valid or excludable as a his treating physicians did not know this
frtexisting illness. Mr. Richard Schlade, prior to July 1980. He submitted discharge
toother claims examiner, testified that one summaries to this effect prepared by him< the first bills submitted to Nationwide self and Dr. Bruce Larson, an endocrinolo**s from a radiologist and referred to the gist, who also treated Jerry at the Hospital
*riier surgery for parathyroid adenoma. of the Good Samaritan in Los Angeles. At
Aformletter was sent to Arizona Optical trial, Dr. Skinner testified that, in hindResting the names and addresses of all sight, he now believes the tumor removed
**tors that had seen Jerry since 1 January in 1979 was probably cancerous.
**0i and further requesting the LinthiNationwide also received the admitting
eain
s to give authorization for Nationwide
records and discharge summaries from Jer*• obtain medical information from these
ry's 1979 surgery at Phoenix General Hos**tors. This letter did not state that the pital. These records contained the conclu^dical information sought was part of an sion that the 1979 parathyroid tumor was
**estigation concerning whether the claim benign. However, the confirmation letter
***>uld be denied as a preexisting illness. from Dr. Soule at the Mayo^ Clinic concernpScy number as part of the requested
prance information.

Upon receipt of the authorization and list
^doctors, Nationwide sent each physician
|4<
Dear Doctor" letter. These form letters
guested information concerning any con^ the doctor had with Jerry, either in
^ o n or by telephone. The letters also
^fcht: any symptoms Jerry exhibited, di•fltosis by the doctor, medications preKnb
^d or services rendered, fees charged

ing the tumor is absent from the Nationwide file.
Ms. Nihoff made the final decision to
deny Jerry's claim based upon her determination that he had been receiving treatment for cancer during the ninety day exclusionary period even though the cancer
was undiagnosed at that time. Ms. Nihoff
testified that the treatment consisted of the
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office visits and blood tests. She further
stated that it was her understanding of
Nationwide policy that treatment could include any contact with a doctor, such as
visiting his office or talking with him on
the telephone.
On 20 October 1980, a denial letter was
sent to Arizona Optical. This letter stated
that Jerry's claim was denied because he
had received treatment "for this illness,,
within ninety days of the policy's effective
date. It further stated that a review of the
denial was possible upon request. The denial letter was sent only to Arizona Optical,
as the policyholder, even though Nationwide knew that Sandra Linthicum no longer worked there. Sandra did not receive a
copy of this letter and states she was not
informed of the denial.
Jerry was hospitalized again at Phoenix
General Hospital on 28 October 1980.
When Sandra gave the admitting personnel
her insurance information, she was informed that Jerry's previous hospital bill
had not been paid. Upon telephoning Nationwide from the hospital, Sandra states,
she was informed by Ms. Nihoff for the
first time that the claim had been denied on
the basis of a preexisting illness. Subsequently, Jerry was transferred to Mercy
Clinic at St. Joseph's Hospital as a charity
patient From October 1980 until his death
in February 1982, Jerry remained a charity
patient at Mercy Clinic, receiving out-patient treatment between hospital stays.
Dr. Skinner testified that it was his opinion
that Jerry eventually became paralyzed
due to the delay involved in obtaining treatment through Mercy Clinic. Dr. Skinner
felt the paralysis was avoidable, and could
have been prevented if Jerry could have
afforded private care. Additionally, Sandra, her twelve year old son, other family
members, and friends administered medications and cared for Jerry at his home.
After an inquiry by a Phoenix newspaper
column, "Answerline", Nationwide reviewed its denial in April 1981. Mr. Richard Schlade, after reviewing the file, concluded that the denial was justified. Mr.
Schlade was persuaded by Dr. Rosoff s de-

termination that Jerry had cancer in 197}
and that his previous doctors had misdia^
nosed i t Further, Mr. Schlade testified
that Dr. Larson's discharge summary in&
cated that hypercalcemia and hypertenskm
were secondary to or caused by parathy
roid carcinoma. From this, Mr. Schlai
drew a causational link to the hypercalci£
mia and hypertension reported in w
-^
records of Dr. Luke and determined Jerr|
had parathyroid cancer and had received
treatment for it or a symptom caused by%
during the ninety days prior to the effective date of Nationwide's policy.
Later, Ms. Mary Beth Miller, the claim!
department supervisor, conducted another
review of Jerry's claim. She also conclirf
ed that Jerry had been treated for cancel
or a symptom of it during the ninety daj
exclusionary period, based upon Dr.
son's report that hypercalcemia and hype?
tension are due to parathyroid carcmonS
Ms. Miller, however, showed some unce?
tainty about this conclusion and therefore
sent the file to the home office, where*'
was referred to Mr. Richard Kokesh, u j |
Group Filed Services Manager for Natb&v
wide.
4 ^
Prior to Mr. Kokesh reviewing the ffle^J
was initially examined by his assistant Mfc
Pat Tweeton, a senior claims exainmefc
She wrote on the file:
r:rjffl|
Rich, I think they did an excellent j3fc
on this file. I re-reviewed the whqfc
thing and came to the same conck
they did.
I feel the claim is preexisting. Tb*
problem is, if it is a problem, that W
doctors doing the 1979 surgery did vat
diagnpse as cancer. So neither doctor 9
patient knew this.

?a

My suggestion would be to stick f
denial and advise Wagnon not to disc
with media.
In his review Mr. Kokesh agreed, --^,
eluding primarily on the basis of the opfl*
ions of Drs. Rosoff and Terry, that
denial was justified.
••'-"*-:*•'. u c £ $
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teer la ifgt Wifter Jerry's death, Sandra brought suit
iad I Q | ^ ^ m^nst Nationwide and its claim agency,
de t i i t ^ JLpon, f° r breach of contract and bad
mmaryW S<|. A jury awarded Sandra $14,951.13
typerteaihi S t breach of contract, $150,000 for bad
ky<pfiw^ j & k and $2,000,000 in punitive damages.
£*• ScUtfr Y * M^rt °f appeals reversed the punitive
hyp<frw>4fr M * ^ ^ award but affirmed on all other
trd IjS^jp^'yn We granted review to examine the
of punitive damages.

sciously aware of the evil of his actions, of
the spitefulness of his motives or that his
conduct is so outrageous, oppressive or intolerable in that it creates a substantial
risk of tremendous harm to others that the
evil mind required for the imposition of
punitive damages may be found. Id.

This court and the court of appeals have
attempted to express and illustrate the
type of "evil mind" necessary for punitive
damages in many ways and in a myriad of
BE STANDARD FOR IMPOSITION
contexts. Unfortunately, this has resulted
OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
in an ambiguous, overbroad list of "catch
i When Punitive Damages May Be Im- phrases" from which attorneys pick and
posed
choose in an effort to obtain punitive damages. The various characterizations of
HI
Exemplary
or
punitive
damages
are
ted anofar
conduct allowing recovery of punitive dam£toe
damages
awarded
in
excess
of
full
ilsocoadbl
i f or mm wpensation to the victim in order to pun- ages include:
(1) Malice—express or implied, Arizo5 ninety &y jdfcthe wrongdoer and to deter others from
na Publishing Co. v. Harris, 20
K>n Dr.ljK •dating his conduct. Cassel v. Schacht,
Ariz. 446,181 P. 373 (1919); Magma
a andhypier A Ariz. 495, 496, 683 P.2d 294, 295 (1984);
.
-j^s***^** J-**ser & Keeton, The Law of Torts § 2 at
Copper Co. v. Shuster, 118 Ariz.
s o m e ^ ® ^ ! 1 ^ ed - 1984)*> D o b b s > Handbook on the
151, 575 P.2d 350 (App.1977);
id \herdon* ^w of Remedies § 3.9 at 204 (1973); Re(2) Spite or ill will, State Farm Mutuice,wl*S^t galement (Second) of Torts § 908. Other
al Insurance Co. v. St. Joseph's
KokesSft? *»nales, besides punishment and deterHospital, 107 Ariz. 498, 489 P.2d
837 (1971);
r&r KaftP J*ce, utilized as justification for punitive
fcaages include preserving the peace, in(3) Evil intent or bad motive, Smith v.
king private law enforcement, compenChapman, 115 Ariz. 211, 564 P.2d
ag the fle, I •ting victims for otherwise unrecoverable
900 (1977); McNelis v. Bruce, 90
assistant ifi^ *ses, ^ financing the costs of litigation.
an
Ariz. 261, 367 P.2d 625 (1962);
is
®s, Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of
(4)
Gross negligence, Gila Water Co. v.
u*fl
Native Damages, 56 So. Cal.L.Rev. 1, 3
Gila
Land and Cattle Co., 30 Ariz.
excellenf
WZ).
569, 249 P. 751 (1926); Iaeger v.
d the
ft] In deciding whether punitive dam;"' Metcalf, 11 Ariz. 283, 94 P. 1094
le conduiaoa
^ are awardable, the inquiry should be
(1908);
•'-v*?*-'SiHHBfil
k&sed upon the wrongdoer's mental
•• C^jsEflflPSlw
(5) Wanton, reckless or willful acts,
risting.«B» *te. Dobbs, supra. To recover punitive
Lutfy v. R.D. Roper & Sons Motor
era, t h a t t p
^n&ges something more is required over
Co., 57 Ariz. 495, 115 P.2d 161
gery didJW* *d above the "mere commission of a tort"
•
(1941);
;her doctor of
flings v. Apodaca, — Ariz. — , — ,
(6) Intentional misconduct, Id.; Wet^ P.2d
,
[No. 18333-PR, filed 22
zel v. Gulf Oil Corp., 455 F.2d 857
^ 1986], (slip op. at 28); Prosser & Kee(9th Cir.1972);
**, supra, § 2 at 9-10. The wrongdoer
(7) Fraud, Jenkins v. Skelton, 21 Ariz.
J^t be consciously aware of the wrong663, 192 P. 249 (1920);
**foess or harmfulness of his conduct and
™> continue to act in the same manner in
(8) Oppression, Id.; Salt River Water
agreed, cofr;
d e r a t e contravention to the rights of
Users' Association v. Giglio, 113
s of the
^ victim. Rawlings v. Apodaca, supra
Ariz. 190, 549 P.2d 162 (1976); Jerrry, that jb*
^P.2dat
. (slip op. at 29-30). It is
man v. O'Leary, 145 Ariz. 397, 701
^7 when the wrongdoer should be conP.2d 1205 (App.1985); •
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(9) Extreme, aggravated or outrageous
conduct, Lerner v.
Brettschneider,
123 Ariz. 152, 598 P.2d 515 (App.
1979);
(10) Conduct involving an unreasonable
. risk of causing distress, Wetzel v.
Gulf Oil Corp., supra,;
(11) Reckless disregard for or indifference to the rights, interests or safety of others, Smith v. Chapman,
supra.; Salt River Water Users9
Association v. Giglio, supra; Sellinger v. Freeway Mobile Homes
Sales, Inc., 110 Ariz. 573, 521 P.2d
1119 (1976); Neilson v. Flashberg,
101 Ariz. 335, 419 P.2d 514 (1966);
McNelis v. Bruce, supra;
Schmidt
v. American Leasco, 139 Ariz. 509,
679 P.2d 532 (App.1983);
(12) Criminal acts or conduct, Puz v.
McDonald, 140 Ariz. 77, 680 P.2d
. 213 (App.1984);
(13) Acts done in bad faith, Huggins v.
Deinhard, 127 Ariz. 358, 621 P.2d
45 (App.1980).
The numerous expressions of the conduct
and mental state required for punitive damages has broadened its scope but loosened
its impact.
[C]ourts have developed a large vocabulary to describe the kind of mental state
required—the defendant must be "malicious", "reckless", "oppressive", "evil",
"wicked", or guilty of "wanton misconduct", or "morally culpable" conduct
Since all of these words refer to the
same underlying culpable state of mind,
and since courts have not been at all
concerned with any shades of difference
that might be found between, say, malice
and recklessness, almost any term that
describes misconduct coupled with a bad
state of mind will describe the case for
punitive damages.
Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies,
§ 3.9 at 205. Having juries decide whether
to award compensatory vs. punitive damages based on vague verbal distinctions
between mere negligence, gross negligence
and reckless indifference is often futile and
nothing more than semantic jousting by

opposing attorneys. Further, it leads to
misapplication of the extraordinary chfl
remedy of punitive damages which should
be appropriately restricted to only the most
egregious of wrongs. "A standard that
allows exemplary awards based upon gron
negligence or mere reckless disregard o(
the circumstances overextends the ava^
ability of punitive damages, and dulls the
potentially keen edge of the doctrine as aa
effective deterrent of truly reprehensible
conduct." Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 Aid
1353, 1361 (Me.1985).
^
We find ourselves in agreement with the
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine and "perceive cogent reasons for avoiding an ove*
broad application of the [punitive damages]
doctrine." Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 AJSdst
1360. The type of tortious conduct justifying punitive damages should be only those
limited classes of consciously malicious j *
outrageous acts of misconduct where pufr
ishment and deterrence is both paramount
and likely to be achieved.
-•••'•""i^fr
[3] We, therefore, conclude that a'fell
broad standard for punitive damages jl
needed. As discussed earlier, it is the "ell
mind" that distinguishes action justifying
the imposition of punitive damages. Sjf
Rawlings v. Apodaca, supra. In whatevtf
way the requisite mental state is ^
pressed, the conduct must also be aggravated and outrageous. It is conscious actk*
of a reprehensible character. The key j *
the wrongdoer's intent to injure the plafr
tiff or his deliberate interference with t|*
rights of others, consciously disregard!^
the unjustifiably substantial risk of sign*)*
cant harm to them. Rawlings v. Apod(M
— P.2d at
. (slip op. at 27). Wh*
the necessary "evil mind" may be i n f e r w
it is still this "evil mind" in addition^
outwardly aggravated, outrageous, ©**
cious, or fraudulent conduct which is t*
quired for punitive damages. We hold thi»
before a jury may award punitive damag**
there must be evidence of an "evil minf
and aggravated and outrageous condttj
•

B.

• -t>«4|

Burden of Proof For Punitive i ^ E
ages
.''v, • • • • ^ ™ B
[4] In examining the currently ta<||
scope of punitive damages, we reach a l l
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farted issue, the burden of proof in a claim
for punitive damages. As this remedy is
only to be awarded in the most egregious
of cases, where there is reprehensible conduct combined with an evil mind over and
above that required for commission of a
tort, we believe it is appropriate to impose
a more stringent standard of proof. When
punitive damages are loosely assessed,
they become onerous not only to defendants but the public as a whole. Additionally, its deterrent impact is lessened. Therefore, while a plaintiff may collect compensatory damages upon proof by a preponderance of the evidence of his injuries due to
the tort of another, we conclude that recovery of punitive damages should be awardable only upon clear and convincing evidence
of the defendant's evil mind. See Tuttle v.
Raymond, 494 A.2d at 1362-1363. In making this distinction, we are not alone. See
e.g. Tuttle v. Raymond, supra; Travelers
Indemnity Co. v. Armstrong, 442 N.E.2d
349 (Ind.1982); Wangen v. Ford Motor
Co., 97 Wis.2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980);
Or.Rev.Stat. § 30.925 (1981); Minn.Stat.
Ann. § 549.20 (1984); See also Colo.Rev.
Stat. § 13-25-127(2) (1973) (proof beyond a
reasonable doubt); Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive Damages Procedures, 69 Va.L.Rev. 269, 296298 (1983) (recommending such a higher
standard). We hold that the burden of
proof for punitive damages is by clear and
convincing evidence.
G Punitive Damages in Bad Faith
Claims
[5] In the instant case, we consider
whether punitive damages may be awarded
to a case involving the tort of bad faith.
This question was recently answered by
«is court in Rawlings v. Apodaca, supra.
w a bad faith tort case, as with all other
torts, punitive damages are not awardable
Unless there is something more than the
conduct required to establish the tort.
Rawlings v. Apodaca, — P.2d at
;
8
% op. at 28; Farr v. Transamerica Occidental Life Insurance Co., 145 Ariz. 1, 8,
699 P.2d 376, 384 (1984). However, as we
*tated in Rawlings, supra, punitive dam-

ages are recoverable in a bad faith action
when the defendant's conduct is "aggravated, outrageous, malicious or fraudulent"
combined with an evil mind as evidenced by
a showing that the defendant was consciously aware of the needs and rights of
the insured and nevertheless, ignored its
obligations. —» P.2d at
. (slip op. at
30). We hold that punitive damages may
be awarded in a bad faith case. Rawlings,
supra. (
.
;--....IS THERE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
TO AWARD PUNITIVE DAMAGES
^ IN THIS CASE?
[6] In the case before us, the court of
appeals held that the award of punitive
damages was not justified. We agree.
While Nationwide may not have dealt
with the Linthicums in good faith, there is
not sufficient evidence of an evil mind,
illustrating a desire to harm consciously
disregard the Linthicum's rights, as is necessary to warrant punitive damages. We
reach this conclusion irrespective of whether the burden of proof is clear and convincing evidence or the lesser standard of a
preponderance of the evidence.
Initially we note, as did the court of
appeals, that "certain of the alleged acts of
misconduct [by Nationwide] were specifically approved by Arizona law. For example, the practice of issuing an insurance
certificate to summarize the terms and conditions of the policy, and transmitting that
certificate to the insured through her employer, is authorized by . . . A.R.S. § 201402." Linthicum v. Nationwide Life Insurance
Company, 12$ P.2d at 714.
Other acts of misconduct alleged by the
Linthicums to warrant punitive damages
include: sending a denial of claim* letter
only to Arizona Optical and not to Sandra;
not disclosing the medical basis for the
denial; investigating all dependent claims
filed in the first year of coverage for potential denial; not directly asking any of Jerry's doctors whether he had treated Jerry
during the ninety day exclusionary period
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before issuing its denial; strictly construEric H. MARCUS and Irene M. Marcus, $
ing its policy against the,insured; conducthusband and wife, Appellees,
,;|
ing only fake reviews of the claim denial
after a newspaper inquiry; refusing to provide Sandra with a copy of the policy;
Lillian L. FOX, a single woman, and,
knowing the harm a denial would cause the
Robert A. Gold, a single man,
Linthicums and denying the claim anyway.
Appellants.
While we do not entirely agree with the
No. 18552-PR. ~"
court of appeals characterization of these
facts as "procedural errors on the part of
••-"- Supreme Court of Arizona,
Nationwide", neither do we find them suffiEn Banc. \.i
cient to support an award of punitive damages. Linthicum v. Nationvride Life Ins.
July 25, 1986.
Co., 723 P.2d at 714.
Reconsideration Denied Sept. 9, 1986.
Admittedly, Nationwide does appear to
construe its policy strictly in its own favor.
Investigating all dependent claims filed
Action was brought seeking damages^
within the first year for potential denial based on a claim that a contract was fraud-*!
and denying all claims upon any possible ulently induced. The Superior Court, PiroaJ
supportable basis is definitely not in the County, Nos. 196669 & 210316, Robert B^|
insured's interest. These facts are defi- Buchanan, J., entered judgment on a WS.£
nitely relevant to a claim for bad faith; verdict in favor of the plaintiff but refused^
however, without evidence of an "evil
to award attorney fees. The Court of Aj£V
mind" there is not a claim for punitive
peals, 723 P.2d 691, affirmed a denial of theT;
damages. Nationwide follows a tough
request for attorney fees, and plaintiff peti-^*
claims policy but it is not "aggravated,
' tioned for review. The Supreme Court,j|
outrageous, oppressive or fraudulent".
Hays, J., held that an action for rescission^
The knowledge of the harm its denial and/ or damages based on a claim that Bt
was causing the Linthicums is definitely contract was fraudulently induced is one.,
relevant to proving an "evil mind". If it "arising out of a contract" within meaninju
•: yWt
had been shown that there was a deliberate of attorney fees statute.
,
'-^m
ti:
ignoring of the Linthicums' rights and
Vacated and remanded.
needs, then punitive damages might* have
been awardable. In the instant case, Nationwide reviewed the file several times
because of the gravity of the situation.. Costs <3=»173(1)
An action for rescission and/or dam^
While the petitioner may not be satisfied
ages
based on a claim that a contract was^
with the procedures utilized in these refraudulently
induced is one "arising out of^
views, they do not appear to be designed to
a
contract"
within meaning of attorney*
deny valid claims. We do not find suffifees statute.
A.R.S. § 12-341.01, subd. A«|
SUltui/v.
*-..-.
cient evidence to affirm the punitive damSee
publication
Words and Phrases
age award.
for other judicial constructions and
We reverse and vacate the award for
definitions.
punitive damages and affirm the remainder
of the judgment of the trial court and the
opinion of the court of appeals.
DeConcini McDonald Brammer Yetwinj
•
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HOLOHAN, CJ., GORDON, V.CJ., and
HAYS and FELDMAN, JJ., concur.

Lacy, P.C by David C. Anson and Mich*
R. l/rman, Tucson, for appellees. > - •*
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